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Over the centuries architectural theory evolved several notions of embodiment,
proposing in the nineteenth and twentieth century that architectonic experience is
related to physiological responses of the observer. Recent advances in the cognitive
neuroscience of embodiment (or bodily self-consciousness) enable empirical studies
of architectonic embodiment. Here, we investigated how architecture modulates bodily
self-consciousness by adapting a video-based virtual reality (VR) setup previously used
to investigate visuo-tactile mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness. While standing
in two different interiors, participants were filmed from behind and watched their
own virtual body online on a head-mounted display (HMD). Visuo-tactile strokes were
applied in synchronous or asynchronous mode to the participants and their virtual body.
Two interiors were simulated in the laboratory by placing the sidewalls either far or
near from the participants, generating a large and narrow room. We tested if bodily
self-consciousness was differently modulated when participants were exposed to both
rooms and whether these changes depend on visuo-tactile stimulation. We measured
illusory touch, self-identification, and performed length estimations. Our data show that
synchronous stroking of the physical and the virtual body induces illusory touch and
self-identification with the virtual body, independent of room-size. Moreover, in the narrow
room we observed weak feelings of illusory touch with the sidewalls and of approaching
walls. These subjective changes were complemented by a stroking-dependent modulation
of length estimation only in the narrow room with participants judging the room-size
more accurately during conditions of illusory self-identification. We discuss our findings
and previous notions of architectonic embodiment in the context of the cognitive
neuroscience of bodily self-consciousness and propose an empirical framework grounded
in architecture, cognitive neuroscience, and VR.
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INTRODUCTION
Inspired by Vitruvian theory, architects evolved several notions
of embodiment (Vitruvius, 1st century BC). The classic ideal of
architectonic embodiment, characterized as the bodily experience
of a modular interior (e.g., as observed in the Pantheon in Rome),
was further developed by Renaissance architects (Alberti, 1450).
They proposed to enhance architectonic embodiment by com-
bining modularity with experienced aspects of verticality (e.g.,
as known from the gothic domes) into a coherent architectonic
form (Argan, 1946). Architectonic cues were thereby used to
establish a sequence of predefined view and vanishing points in
space, guiding the observer’s body and eye movements through
linear perspective according to the most advantageous effects of
the architectonic forms. The thereby evoked impression of an
architectonic continuum, comprehensive of modularity and ver-
ticality from a phenomenological point of view, has since then
been referred to as the ideal of the Renaissance (Burckhardt,
1860).
Under the influence of the empirical biological sciences the
notion of architectonic embodiment has been revisited in the
nineteenth century, highlighting physiological and psychological
aspects (Semper, 1860; Vischer, 1872; Lotze, 1884). Along these
lines art historians have argued that the reference to the human
body, bymeans of massive tectonic structures (i.e., crafted vertical
elements) or spatial modules (i.e., regularly shaped void interiors)
may facilitate the observer’s identification with the environment
through mechanisms of corporeal resonance (Wölfflin, 1886;
Schmarsow, 1893). Particularly, Heinrich Wölfflin associated the
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 354 | 1
Pasqualini et al. “Seeing” and “feeling” architecture
physiognomy of the human body to architectonic cues based on
oculomotor, somatosensory, and vestibular responses. Although
the multisensory nature of architectonic embodiment is promi-
nently present in Wölfflin’s and others’ theories, the exact role of
own-body signals in the experience and appreciation of architec-
ture has to date never been studied empirically.
In cognitive neuroscience embodiment and bodily self-
consciousness have been associated with the feeling of owning a
body, i.e., body ownership or self-identification (Tsakiris et al.,
2007; Salomon et al., 2012), and the feeling of being located at
one specific position in space, i.e., self-location (Schwabe and
Blanke, 2008; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Studies in cogni-
tive neuroscience have shown that self-identification and self-
location can be modulated experimentally through visuo-tactile
conflicts in healthy participants using immersive virtual reality
(VR) to induce the so-called Full-Body-Illusion (FBI; Ehrsson,
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008;
Aspell et al., 2009; Slater et al., 2009).
In the mentioned studies, participants wearing a head-
mounted display (HMD) were filmed from behind at a distance
of two meters and the filmed scene was projected on their HMD
(Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Aspell et al., 2009). While partici-
pants were stroked with a rod on their backs, they were seeing
on the HMD their own videotaped back or virtual body being
stroked in front of them either in real-time, i.e., synchronous
stroking, or with addition of a short delay, i.e., asynchronous
stroking. In the synchronous condition participants reported illu-
sory touch, that is, the feeling of being touched where they
saw the virtual body being touched, and the feeling of self-
identifying with the virtual body, that is, they felt as if the virtual
body was their body (illusory self-identification). In addition,
a change in self-location was found, meaning that participants
showed a drift in self-location toward the virtual body. Both
effects of self-identification and self-location were smaller or
abolished for asynchronous stroking and also when the par-
ticipants were presented a human-sized box as control object
(Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Other studies have reported illu-
sory ownership and self-identification with non-bodily objects
in peripersonal space induced by visuo-tactile stroking (Armel
and Ramachandran, 2003; Hohwy and Paton, 2010). Yet, how
self-identification is influenced by visuo-spatial properties of the
(architectonic) environment and vice versa has not been investi-
gated previously.
Following principles of ecological psychology and embodied
perception in experimental psychology, recent research has fur-
ther revealed that own-body representations may influence how
an observer perceives an environment (Gibson, 1979; Neisser,
1988). It has thus been demonstrated that perceived lengths in
a visually presented environment might be influenced by the
seen scale of one’s own body within such an environment (Witt
et al., 2005; Linkenauger et al., 2010). Moreover, such altered
own-body perceptions seem to be modulated by experimentally
induced changes in body ownership (van der Hoort et al., 2011).
With respect to embodied perception in immersive VR it has also
been shown that having a virtual representation of one’s body
in an immersive virtual environment helps to improve distance
estimation (Mohler et al., 2010).
Here, we performed an experiment on the effects of two
distinct architectonic interiors on bodily self-consciousness. We
inquired whether experimentally induced illusory touch and
self-identification (in the above described experimental setup;
Lenggenhager et al., 2007) depends on the size of the architectonic
interior by presenting the virtual body in a narrow or a large room
and by exposing participants to synchronous and asynchronous
visuo-tactile stimulation. To modulate the effect of room-size we
placed two sidewalls next to the participants either in extraper-
sonal space, i.e., beyond reach (large room-size condition), or
in peripersonal space, i.e., the space surrounding the body (nar-
row room-size condition; Fogassi et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al.,
1997; Ladavas et al., 1998; Teneggi et al., 2013). Additionally, we
measured whether our participants’ capacity to perceive the archi-
tectonic space dimensions changed during the different exper-
imental conditions, expecting an improved ability during the
illusion conditions. To this purpose we asked our participants
to judge the length of several lines that we presented in the
architectonic space during the different experimental conditions.
Our results show that synchronous stroking of the partici-
pant’s body and the seen virtual body induces illusory touch
and self-identification with the virtual body—independent from
room-size. Furthermore, we found that weak feelings of illu-
sory touch with the sidewalls and feelings of room retraction
were induced in the narrow room. These subjective changes were
complemented by a stroking-dependent modulation of length
estimation only in the narrow roomwith participants judging the
room dimensions more accurately during conditions of illusory
self-identification. We discuss these data with respect to cognitive
neuroscience of embodiment and bodily self-consciousness, and
relate our data to theories of architectonic embodiment and VR.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-four healthy, right-handed participants (5 females;
23.5 ± 2.8 years; mean age ± SD) participated in the study. All
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and no his-
tory of neurological or psychiatric conditions. Participants were
sampled from the EPFL population. They were remunerated with
20 Sfr. an hour.
ETHICS STATEMENT
All participants gave written informed consent to the experiment.
The study protocol was approved by the local ethics research
committee—La Commission d’Ethique de la Recherche Clinique
de la Faculté de Biologie et de Medecine at the University of
Lausanne, Switzerland and was performed in accordance with the
ethical standards laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki.
VIRTUAL REALITY SETUP
We used the video-based VR setup as previously described in
Lenggenhager et al. (2007) and Aspell et al. (2009) and adapted
it in such a way that the image seen by the participant would
include a much larger proportion of space surrounding the vir-
tual body (Figure 1). In the above-mentioned studies only the
upper part of the participant’s body was shown in a neutral envi-
ronment and without any particular environmental cues. Also,
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FIGURE 1 | The architectonic setup and the participant’s view. The setup
with the movable walls and backstroking for the large room (A) and the
narrow room (B). The participant’s impression of space viewed through the
HMD for the large (C) and narrow room-sizes (D). Filming of the scene in
stereo 3D with two webcams combined to top lighting allowed a realistic
representation of depth.
the virtual body appeared to be closer to the participants’ view-
point, filling their visual field with the virtual representation of
their own upper body. In our setup, however, the virtual body
was entirely embedded in a virtual scene representing two dis-
tinct architectonic interiors, large and narrow, with the same
room depth. The entire scene was filmed and dispatched in
stereo, rendering the impression of a three-dimensional archi-
tectonic envelope that contained the fully embedded virtual
body. For this purpose we used 2 webcams (Logitech C510,
Apples, Switzerland) fixed on a tripod with 7 cm separation using
a custom support to generate a stereo image, projected on a
high definition Head-Mounted-Display (HMD, model Virtual
Research Systems VR1280, Aptos, CA), rendering 2 images of
1280 × 1024 pixels at 60Hz, with a diagonal field of view
of 60◦. The cameras were centered on the backside of either
room, aligned at the same distance and directed toward the
front wall.
In order to change the size of the room (factor room-size)
in which both, the subject and the virtual body were standing,
we used 4 custom-made panels (1.50 × 2.50 meters, length ×
height) mounted on wheels, aligned as one 6 meters long mov-
able wall (Figures 1A,B). In combination with one corner of the
experimentation room the movable walls formed either a large
room (surface 6 × 3.50 meters, length × width) or a narrow
room (surface 6 × 0.80 meters, length × width). Synchronous or
asynchronous stroking (factor stroking) was applied to the back
of the participants by the use of a wooden stick as described
previously (Figures 1C,D) (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). For syn-
chronous stroking the image captured from the webcams was
directly relayed to the HMD. For asynchronous stroking a delay
(800ms) was inserted.
Length estimation was tested with previously captured images
of the two interiors. The images showed the same setup from the
identical visual angle, yet, including some black bars presented
in different positions and orientations (Figure 2). A vertical black
bar (50 cm) placed at the bottom center of the white front wall was
used as the reference bar for the estimations. The bars involved in
the length estimation consisted of: 5 horizontal bars placed on the
bottom of the front wall (lengths of 40, 45, 50, 55, and 60 cm); 5
bars seen on the ground in perspective and centered with respect
to the room-size (lengths 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 cm); 5 bars seen
on the ground along the right wall (lengths 40, 50, 60, 70, and
80 cm; Figure 2); and 5 bars seen on the ground along the left wall
of lengths 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 cm. For each of the four experi-
mental conditions we presented a total of 20 bars in randomized
order.
PROCEDURE
Participants were asked to wear the HMD for the whole dura-
tion of each experimental condition and to stand at the center
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FIGURE 2 | Stimuli for length estimation presented in perspective. The stimuli of the length estimation task (black bars) as presented on the HMD after
each block of the FBI for the two interiors. The bars were presented in perspective along the sidewalls of the large (A) and narrow room (B).
of the room (large or narrow) facing the front wall at a dis-
tance of 4.5 meters from the webcams (Figure 1). Before car-
rying out the experimental conditions we performed a training
session, allowing the study participants to familiarize with the
setup. The vertical reference bar was presented to the partici-
pants, followed by one shorter and one longer horizontal bar.
For each subject the cameras and the HMD were calibrated and
adjusted ensuring a correct visual angle throughout the four
conditions.
The four experimental conditions were run in separate blocks
with randomization of factors: room-size (large/narrow) and
stroking (synchronous/asynchronous) in a full 2 × 2 factorial
design. Participants were filmed from behind by the webcams
and watched, on the HMD, their body standing in front of
them as a virtual body (Figures 1C,D). First, participants were
exposed to the reference bar and then to visuo-tactile stroking
for 2min. Then participants were asked to perform a two-
alternative forced choice task, responding whether they perceived
the presented bars as longer or shorter than the reference bar
(Figure 2). Responses were collected by means of a joystick
(Logitech Cordless RumblePad 2). During the four experimen-
tal conditions the participants were exposed to white noise over
the HMD headphones. ExpyVR (http://lnco.epfl.ch/expyvr) soft-
ware was used to render the stimuli and record the responses. Size
estimation was carried out immediately after the 2min stroking
period. At the end of each experimental condition, the HMD was
removed and participants were requested to answer a 14 item
written questionnaire and to rate each item on a Likert scale
between −3 (not at all) and +3 (very much) (Table 1).
DATA ANALYSIS
Data analysis was performed with Matlab R2012a (Mathworks
Inc., Natick, MA) and Statistica 10 (Statsoft Inc., Tulsa, OK).
Questionnaire scores were analyzed using repeated-measures
analyses of variance (ANOVA) with the factors stroking (syn-
chronous/asynchronous), room-size (large/narrow), and question
(1–14; Table 1) as within-participant factors. For further post-hoc
tests for specific significant interactions we performed t-tests. In
order to avoid false positives we excluded any significant answer
Table 1 | The questionnaire completed after each experimental block.
“During the past moments sometimes. . .”:
(1) . . . I was feeling the touch of the stick where i saw the virtual body
being touched.
(2) . . . I clearly felt that the stick touching the virtual body was causing the
touch I was feeling.
(3) . . . I clearly felt that the virtual body was my body.
(4) . . . It seemed as if my physical body was drifting toward the virtual
body.
(5) . . . It seemed as if I might have more than one body.
(6) . . . It seemed as if I was standing in two places at the same time.
(7) . . . I felt as if the walls of the room were almost lightly touching me.
(8) . . . I had the impression to see the front wall drifting toward me.
(9) . . . It seemed as if I was floating in the room.
(10) . . .I could feel that I was standing inside the room.
(11) . . .I felt as if the void space was becoming a part of myself.
(12) . . .I felt as if the walls were getting closer to myself.
(13) . . .I felt that the virtual environment was a place, rather than an image.
(14) . . .The first time I saw the virtual body disappear I was pulled into the
space.
that was not confirmed if tested with an alternative and more
critical non-parametric test (Wilcoxon test).
The analysis of performance in the length estimation task
was done using Probit analysis (Craven, 1993; Howe and Purves,
2002, 2005). Probit analysis provides a method to determine the
error distribution in the length estimation of bars of different
lengths presented in a task in comparison to a reference bar. The
experimental factors were introduced as possible indicators of
the variations of estimation. Since Probit analysis is a particular
type of generalized linear model, we normalized all the experi-
mental factors to introduce the Beta values as indicators of the
relative strength of the different factors. A factor was consid-
ered to be relevant, if it showed a significance level of p < 0.05.
In addition, the factor was only included if it resulted in a sig-
nificantly smaller residual error of the fit (χ2 comparison test,
p < 0.05).
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To the best of our knowledge Probit analysis has not been used
previously in experiments addressing bodily self-consciousness.
Therefore, as a complementary analysis on the same data we
considered the subjective length estimations (of each particular
bar length and position) in relation to the probability thresh-
old of perceiving the bars as shorter than the reference bar.
For example, a probability threshold of 0.5 corresponds to a
bar length subjectively estimated as being equal to the length of
the reference stimulus [for example see Kannape et al. (2010)
for a similar measure]. We excluded those participants, whose
subjective estimation thresholds were outside the range of esti-
mation of the stimuli presented for any chosen threshold. A
pilot study revealed the tendency to underestimate the length
of the presented stimuli. Hence, in order to include a greater
amount of participants, we favored a 0.75 probability threshold
of answering shorter, instead of a 0.50 probability threshold of
equal length (ruled out by the forced-choice task). This was ana-




Questionnaire analysis revealed the following two-way inter-
actions: question by room-size [Partial η2 = 0.165, F(13, 299) =
4.54, p < 0.001] and question by stroking [Partial η2 = 0.428,
F(13, 299) = 17.22, p < 0.001; Table 1]. We also found the follow-
ing main effects: room-size [Partial η2 = 0.190, F(1, 23) = 5.4069,
p = 0.0292], stroking [Partial η2 = 0.555, F(1, 23) = 28.72, p <
0.001] and question [Partial η2 = 0.535, F(13, 299) = 26.47, p <
0.001]. No other effects were significant.
Further post-hoc testing of the question by stroking interaction
revealed a significant variation with stroking for three questions
(Figure 3A; Table 1). These were question 1 [. . . I was feeling the
touch of the stick where I saw the virtual body being touched;
t(1, 23) = 9.3134, p < 0.001], where the synchronous condition
scored higher (mean = 2.52, s.e. = 0.18) than the asynchronous
condition (mean = −1.10, s.e. = 0.42); question 2 [. . . I clearly
felt that the stick touching the virtual body was causing the touch
I was feeling; t(1, 23) = 5.6168, p < 0.001], where again the syn-
chronous condition revealed a higher score (mean = 2.02, s.e. =
0.36) than the asynchronous condition (mean = −0.86, s.e. =
0.46) and question 3 [. . . I clearly felt that the virtual body wasmy
body; t(1, 23) = 2.6602, p = 0.014], where the synchronous con-
dition also showed higher scores (mean = 1.62, s.e. = 0.39) than
the asynchronous (mean = 0.62, s.e. = 0.47). None of the control
questions was significantly modulated by factor stroking.
Further post-hoc testing with respect to the question by room-
size interaction showed a significant variation for question 7 and
12 (Figure 3B;Table 1). Question 7 referred to illusory touch with
the architectonic interior (. . . I felt as if the walls of the room
were almost lightly touching me). Although ratings were low we
found question 7 to be significantly stronger [t(1, 23) = 3.5973,
p = 0.002] in the narrow (mean = −0.73, s.e. = 0.39) as com-
pared to the large room condition (mean = −2.06, s.e. = 0.29).
Ratings for question 12 were also low and inquired about room
retraction (. . . I felt as if the walls were getting closer to myself).
This was found to be significantly stronger [t(1, 23) = 3.1759, p =
0.030] in the narrow room (mean= −1.2, s.e. = 0.35) than in the
large room (mean = −1.90, s.e. = 0.32). No further question was
modulated by factor room-size.
FIGURE 3 | Subjective responses. (A) Bodily self-consciousness. Results
of the questionnaire responses are shown (mean and standard error) for
the items that depended on stroking (questions 1 and 3). (B) Architectonic
embodiment. Results of the questionnaire responses are shown (mean
and standard error) for the items that depended on room-size (questions 7
and 12).
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LENGTH ESTIMATION
Several factors significantly contributed to the probability of
perceiving the bars shorter than the reference bar (Figure 4A).
As expected the main factor was the length of the pre-
sented bars (beta = −1.154, p < 0.001). The factor room-size
(beta = −0.2785, p < 0.001) and the interaction between stroking
and room-size were also significant (beta = 0.1017, p = 0.018).
No other factors, such as the bar positions, affected the responses.
In order to further analyze the stroking by room-size interaction
we repeated the Probit analysis considering the large and narrow
room-size conditions separately. This analysis revealed that the
synchronous narrow room condition was the main driving fac-
tor for the interaction (beta = −0.1209, p = 0.049; Figure 4B).
The same analysis for the large room condition was not sig-
nificant when considered separately (beta = 0.0827, p = 0.170;
Figure 4C), suggesting that stroking synchrony only affected
length estimations when participants performed the estimations
in the narrow room.
The same results were found in a complementary analysis
using repeatedmeasures ANOVAon the subjective bar length esti-
mation thresholds. The subjective threshold of 0.75 probability of
answering shorter included 19 of 24 participants (see the meth-
ods section for the exclusion criterion). The interaction room-
size by stroking was significant [Partial η2 = 0.318, F(1, 18) =
8.389, p = 0.01]. Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed significant
differences between large and narrow room-size conditions for
FIGURE 4 | Bodily self-consciousness modulates length estimation. (A)
The result of the Probit analysis shown for the four conditions across all bar
lengths. The fit of the curves together with the confidence intervals suggest
that the modulation in length estimation is specific for the narrow room and
modulated by the stroking synchrony factor. (B) The effect of the stroking
synchrony factor on the responses, independent of the presented bar length,
is shown considering only responses in the narrow room. A Probit analysis
shows a significant effect of the stroking synchrony factor, irrespective of the
bar length. (C) The same Probit analysis considering only responses from the
large room shows no significant effect of the stroking synchrony factor, (D) An
analysis of variance of the subjective bar length corresponding to a 0.75
probability threshold shows an interaction between the stroking synchrony
factor and room size. Bonferroni post-hoc tests show significant differences
between synchronous and asynchronous stroking only in the narrow room.
There are also differences between the large and the narrow room, but only
for asynchronous stroking. ∗p < 0.05
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asynchronous stroking (p = 0.011). Stroking was also a signif-
icant factor, yet only in the narrow room-size condition (p =
0.043; see Figure 4D). Overall, ANOVA and Bonferroni post-hoc
tests confirmed the interaction factor found in the Probit analysis
for the subjective length at a 0.75 probability level.
The length estimations for the horizontal bars positioned
along the front wall showed a different behavior. The length of
the bars was revealed to be the main factor (p < 0.001). Stroking
and the interaction stroking by room-size were not found to be
significant (but revealed a non-significant trend; p = 0.08). No
other significant factors were found.
The data on length estimation show that across all conditions
participants estimated the bars presented in perspective as shorter
than the target line. However, in the narrow room, length esti-
mation significantly improved when participants self-identified
with the virtual body (synchronous narrow condition), com-
pared to when self-identification was not present (asynchronous
narrow condition). This effect did not occur for the large
room.
DISCUSSION
Our data show that synchronous stroking of the participant’s
body and the seen virtual body induces illusory touch and
self-identification with the virtual body. Self-identification and
illusory touch were not differently modulated by the two dif-
ferent room-sizes. On the other hand, weak feelings of illusory
touch with the sidewalls and the feeling of the approaching walls
(room retraction) were induced by the narrow room-size. These
subjective changes were complemented by a stroking-dependent
modulation of length estimation only in the narrow room with
participants judging the room dimensions more accurately dur-
ing conditions of illusory self-identification.
ARCHITECTONIC EXPERIENCE AND VISUO-TACTILE BIMODALITY
The FBI is characterized by self-identification with the virtual
body and a measured drift in self-location toward the virtual
body. In our experimental setup a FBI was induced through
visuo-tactile conflicts between felt touches applied to the partici-
pants’ back and seen touches applied to the back of a virtual body.
Participants were filmed from behind and their image was dis-
patched on their HMD, as previously tested by Lenggenhager et al.
(2007) and Aspell et al. (2009). Our results confirm the outcome
of the mentioned studies with respect to illusory touch and self-
identification. In the questionnaires we did not find these aspects
of bodily self-consciousness to be directly modulated by the two
different room sizes.
Asking participants to judge their experiences of the interiors
after the FBI, we found that they experienced very mild sensa-
tions of being touched by the sidewalls as well as the feeling that
the sidewalls were drifting toward them (retraction). Both sensa-
tions were stroking-independent and differed for both room sizes,
being stronger in the narrow room-size condition. This finding
may suggest a mild effect of embodiment of the walls (touch) and
of containment (experienced retraction of the sidewalls) induced
by the room-size.
Previous studies between a participant’s stroked physical hid-
den hand and seen strokes applied to a tabletop or non-human
object induced feelings of illusory touch for the table by
stroking (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003; Hohwy and Paton,
2010). Describing a touch illusion induced through visuo-tactile
stroking of a white box and a hidden participant’s hand, Hohwy
and Paton (2010) found that the physical hand could be felt
to extend toward the box. It was argued that the participants
probably experienced the hand to be located inside the box and
therefore the touch was felt as if “through the box.” In the ques-
tionnaire responses of our study, participants did not declare
such mediating role of stroking with respect to the entire body,
nor the whole interior. We argue that the present illusion of
feeling touched by the sidewalls could only be induced visually
through the architectonic elements located in peripersonal space,
and without any dependence on visuo-tactile stroking as observed
by others for a table or box (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003;
Hohwy and Paton, 2010).
These visually induced touch sensations in conditions with
closer walls seem to relate to previous findings about increased
stimulus detection in peripersonal space (Rizzolatti et al., 1981).
Several studies have since revealed visuo-tactile integration, espe-
cially when in close proximity to the body of the observer
(Ladavas et al., 1998; Haggard et al., 2007; Sambo and Forster,
2009; Teneggi et al., 2013). We thus speculate that the narrow
room, which was perceived within peripersonal space (10 cm or
less lateral distance from participants’ physical body), may be
embodied visually and associated with mild feelings of touch and
containment (room retraction). This effect was absent when the
architectonic boundaries were outside peripersonal space, that
is, in more distant extrapersonal space. Visuo-spatial perception
in the large room might therefore be related to distinct percep-
tual and bodily mechanisms, such as visual perception linked
to oculomotor processes (Witt and Proffitt, 2007). With respect
to self-location in an interior space, this result suggests that
bodily self-consciousness is extended toward those architectonic
elements that are located in close proximity to the physical body.
VISUO-SPATIAL ESTIMATION DEPENDS ON THE EXPERIENCE OF
SPACE
We introduced a behavioral measure that would allow testing the
participants’ ability to perceive the depth of the room, in function
of the FBI. In our hypothesis we assumed that an increased ability
of length estimation in three-dimensional space would correlate
with the participants’ experience of having their center of aware-
ness inside the virtual room and body, i.e. through self-location
and self-identification. Indeed, biases in the length estimation
task were significantly modulated by the experimental conditions
and associated with changes in self-identification and room-size
experience. We also note that, consistent with previous work on
length estimation, changes in length estimation affected all tested
lengths in the same fashion (Craven, 1993; Howe and Purves,
2002, 2005).
The estimations were modulated in a stroking- and room-size-
dependent fashion, as the interaction between stroking and room-
size revealed. We expected that stroking would improve length
estimations by increasing the sensation of spatial depth through
multisensory perception of the virtual interior (associated with
conditions of higher self-identification with the virtual body).
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Compared to the narrow room, in the large room length esti-
mations were generally improved yet independently from stroking
(i.e., synchronous vs. asynchronous stroking did not affect length
estimations in the large room).
A possible interpretation of the difference between the large
and the narrow interior may be given by the visual scaling of the
virtual body inside the changed room proportions, as has already
been argued before (Witt et al., 2005; Linkenauger et al., 2010).
Such scaling-related visuo-spatial perception has also been shown
to be related to self-identification with virtual space and body
(van der Hoort et al., 2011). In addition, self-identification with
the virtual body may have also induced a transposition of the cen-
ter of perspective toward the virtual interior: in the narrow room
this may have led participants to perceive the otherwise underes-
timated length more realistically, as it has been shown that self-
identification with an avatar can reduce HMD-induced space-
compression (Mohler et al., 2010). Since in the large room the FBI
did not affect length estimations, we propose that architectonic
elements close to the body increased the effect of spatial embodi-
ment in combination to self-identification with the virtual body.
These findings are in line with investigations of embodied per-
ception and notions of ecological psychology, stating that vision
depends in a fundamental way on the experience of the body
in space (Gibson, 1979; Neisser, 1988). Our results indicate that
self-identification with the virtual body during the FBI may have
mentally displaced the observer into the architectonic space when
mediated through a visual stimulus in peripersonal space. This
suggests that self-identification can be extended to architectonic
elements close to the body in contrast to a human-sized object
(box) shown in extra-personal space (Lenggenhager et al., 2007).
These findings are compatible not only with a somatosensory
impact of architecture through visual stimulation (as tested here
in Question 7 and 12), but also with improved visuo-spatial per-
ception (length estimation) due to increased self-identification
with elements of the apparently retracting room allowing at the
same time for a more vivid and realistic experience of those por-
tions of the interior perceived in extra-personal space. Further
studies could reveal if these measurable changes in spatial per-
ception may be associated with self-location and an experienced
displacement into the virtual interior.
ARCHITECTURE FROM THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
Linear perspective, if applied to immersive VR, allows to visually
mimic the observer’s first-person perspective by encoding sub-
jective bodily parameters as viewpoint (body size and location),
vanishing point (gaze direction), and monocular cues (i.e., size,
line convergence, foreshortening, occlusion, texture, luminance,
motion, and aerial perspective; Gibson, 1979; Cutting, 1997). In
our VR setup the only cues to determine the relative dimension
of room-size, were the virtual body filmed by the distanced cam-
era in combination with perspective convergence in the narrow
room, or, the visibility of the front wall in the horizontal direc-
tion in the large room. In the narrow condition the front wall was
partly occluded by the virtual body (Figures 1C,D) and the side-
walls were more convergent toward the virtual body. In the large
room condition, the virtual body and the front wall represented
the most important spatial cues.
For both rooms, we did not observe any significant improve-
ment of length estimation due to stroking for the bars presented
horizontally on the front wall. This may be due to the higher
visibility of the bars, allowing a more direct comparison with
the reference bar. Accordingly, the present results in length esti-
mation seem also to be compatible with the reported forward
displacement in self-location that is absent along the right-
left axis (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Aspell et al., 2009). Thus,
Lenggenhager et al. (2007) and Lenggenhager et al. (2009) found
changes in the forward (or sagittal) direction, but not toward the
right or the left. In the present setup the sagittal direction of the
effects generally associated with the FBI also seems to be present
in length estimation in the narrow room and only influence the
latter in the sagittal direction.
ARCHITECTONIC AND BODILY SPACE
Interior space conveys a perceptual experience that is funda-
mental for architecture. Since ancient times this experience has
been related to the phenomenology of space assumedly occur-
ring through embodiment of a structural mass or spatial mod-
ules (Vitruvius, 1st century BC; Alberti, 1450; Semper, 1860).
Crucial to the theories of architectonic embodiment is there-
fore the phenomenological transposition of the experience of
architectonic space toward the masses or voids, hence translating
own-body perception into architectonic dimensions. The out-
come of our study may be discussed with respect to Heinrich
Wölfflin’s and August Schmarsow’s notions of embodiment. In
Heinrich Wölfflin’s theory tectonic expressivity (i.e., achieved
through crafted elements) facilitates embodiment with respect
to the architectonic environment (Wölfflin, 1886). The arousal
of characteristic architectonic sensations (e.g., familiarity, safety,
containment, infinity, etc.) and “moods” (e.g., atmospheres)
seems therefore to be evoked through an empathic resonance
that the built environment induces within the human body.
Hereby the structural moments of architectonic articulation can
be felt by empathic observers, related to bodily physiognomy (e.g.,
through orientation, verticality, and symmetry) and to own-body
processing.
Early theories of empathy (or sympathetic projection; Vischer,
1872; Lotze, 1884) mention that oculomotor mechanisms induce
a bodily resonance within form and space, particularly through
a transposition of perspective toward the figurative mass. In
Wölfflin’s interpretation, architectonic experience is not only
linked to oculomotor (and potentially vestibular mechanisms),
but architectonic form also resonates with mechanisms related
to the bodily boundaries, in terms of a haptic (i.e., tactile, pro-
prioceptive, and motor) response to visual and vestibular stimuli
(Wölfflin, 1886, 1915). Crucially, stressing links to bodily process-
ing, Wölfflin mentions that architectonic asymmetry would have
comparable effects on the human body “as if a limb was missing”
(Wölfflin, 1886).
August Schmarsow’s reply to this proposition points beyond
Vischer’s and Wölfflin’s visuo-motor and physiological mecha-
nisms (Schmarsow, 1893). He speculates about a human sense of
space historically developed in the interiors of primordial inhabi-
tations and related to somesthetic projections. In his terms, the
sense of space is based on the somesthetic experience of the
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architectonic interiors and on an “objectified” perspective gained
by a perspective transposed toward the interior void. Schmarsow’s
observer can thus be characterized as being positioned inside an
architectonic void, experiencing the interior fromwithin (and not
from in front as the observer in Wölfflin’s theory). Furthermore,
through self-displacements within the void, the sense of space
seems to bear an objectified notion, through which previous
points of self-location may be identified from several locations,
thus progressively generating higher-level perspective representa-
tions through space.
By highlighting aspects of bodily self-consciousness in the per-
ception of architectonic space, including motor aspects, both,
Wölfflin and Schmarsow, highlighted experiences related to bod-
ily processing for the understanding and the appreciations of
architecture. Our empirical data strengthen this link and indi-
cate a potential relation between architectonic theory and bodily
self-consciousness (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). The present
participants experienced differences in illusory touch and room
retraction depending on room-size, suggestive of a mild self-
identification not only with the virtual body, but also with the
walls through an involvement of somatosensory mechanisms,
compatible with suggestions by Wölfflin and Schmarsow.
Our behavioral data show that in the narrow room such archi-
tectonic embodiment, probablymodulated through the sidewalls,
concerned not only the tectonic elements (walls) but the whole
architectonic interior, as the length stimuli presented in the
direction of the perspective of our participants were more real-
istically estimated in the FBI. Illusory touch with the sidewalls
may be in line with Wölfflin’s notion of resonance, whereas
self-identification with the virtual interior in combination with
improved size estimation after the FBI in the narrow room
might relate to a projection of bodily space toward the architec-
tonic void, and, of the bodily boundaries toward the enclosure.
Schmarsow’s observer—being positioned within the architecture
and experiencing the space from a first-person perspective ori-
ented toward the void—could therefore be related to experimen-
tally induced changes of bodily self-consciousness of the observer
through the FBI in immersive VR.
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